Public Administration in Armenia 2025

The Principles of Public Administration

Principle 8. The employment framework balances stability and flexibility, ensures accountability of public servants and protects them against undue influence and wrongful dismissal.

Principle 9. Public administration attracts and recruits competent people based on merit and equal opportunities.

Principle 10. Effective leadership is fostered through competence, stability, professional autonomy and responsiveness of accountable top managers.

Principle 11. Public servants are motivated, fairly and competitively paid and have good working conditions. 

Principle 12. Professional development, talent and performance management enhance the skills, efficiency and effectiveness of public servants and promote civil service values.

The main developments since the 2019 Assessment, which occurred shortly thereafter, include the adoption of secondary legislation allowing implementation of the 2018 Civil Service Law (CSL), along with the gradual rollout of the Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS). More recently, in June 2024, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Salaries, mainly to allow for more frequent salary reviews. This was followed by further amendments to the CSL in December 2024, which introduced positive changes, such as granting the Civil Service Office (CSO) the authority to organise horizontal training, as well as some more questionable provisions, such as allowing promotions based solely on performance appraisal results, even for top public management (TPM) roles. A set of by‑laws adopted in January 2025 and June 2025 enabled the implementation of most amendments to the Law on Salaries and the CSL. These by‑laws also include digital human resource management (HRM) provisions, which will take effect in January 2026. While some progress has been made, the implementation of modern and effective HRM in the public service is slow.

The 2018 CSL covers legislative, executive and judicial authorities, but it allows numerous exceptions, narrowing the scope of the civil service. Key groups of public servants in public administration are governed by special legislation that is not fully aligned with public service principles. This also applies to staff in state-controlled private-law bodies performing administrative functions, which are regulated under labour law. The political responsibility is clearly attributed, but it does not cover a large number of persons carrying out functions of public administration who do not fall under the legal regime of the civil service. The CSO's co-ordination and supervision responsibilities are limited to the civil service except in matters of salary policy. Its responsibilities to oversee civil service job classification encroach on the independence of the Ombudsperson. Overall, capacities for modern HRM remain limited: the HRMIS excludes parts of central government; human resources (HR) processes are not yet fully digitalised; workforce planning is absent; and managers’ responsibilities for people-management are not clearly defined.

The top public management (TPM) function in Armenia's central government administration shows some positive features, such as reasonable levels of stability provided by permanent appointments and moderate turnover (18% average annual turnover rate between 2020 and 2024). TPM roles are attractive, with nearly 80% of competitions having five or more eligible candidates in 2024. TPM holders responding to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the functioning of public administration in Armenia 2025, conducted in March-April 2025, generally reported a high sense of managerial autonomy. Nevertheless, these strengths are undermined by the narrow scope of the function. In practice, TPM status in the ministries is limited to secretary generals, while the co-ordination of broad policy areas in ministries and the management of subordinated agencies fall to political appointees. Amendments to the CSL that entered into force in January 2025, allow TPM positions to be filled through direct promotion based on performance appraisal results bypassing open competition, to the detriment of merit in the access to this crucial function. Even when competitions are held, political appointees can sit on selection panels, and this was the case in most of the 2024 competitions analysed. Gender balance in TPM roles is far from being achieved, which contrasts with the strong presence of women in non-managerial jobs.

Access to civil service non-TPM roles in the central government administration is based on competition, transparent and free from discrimination. The CSO has taken some steps to improve information to potential candidates on its website, but the average number of eligible candidates per vacancy is modest (3.2), and only 35 % of externally advertised posts were filled in 2024. Civil-service selection still relies on knowledge-based tests and unstructured interviews; assessment methods based on evidence to predict performance are not sufficiently in place. Political appointees influence the selection process, particularly when filling department head vacancies, and legislation does not fully enshrine the principle of appointing the highest-ranked candidates. Recruitment and selection for temporary employment do not guarantee merit, and legislation insufficiently defines the grounds and limits for temporary work.

Pay structures are clearly set in law and allow for salary progression opportunities. Public service salaries are generally transparent. There was a significant increase in public sector base remuneration in 2023, aiming to decrease the proportion of one-off rewards. However, the diversity of bonuses and the lack of caps on their size persist and lead to substantial differences in remuneration across public bodies. The CSO analyses salaries, including public-private comparisons for some professional groups. The methodology was improved in January 2025 but it needs refinement to guide policy effectively.

Well-being initiatives for public servants are limited, and regular staff surveys are lacking. Occupational Safety and Health rules are not aligned with European Union (EU) standards. Flexible working arrangements, although regulated, are rarely used. Nevertheless, respondents to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants 2025 would still recommend their organisation as a good place to work. Social dialogue within the civil service is virtually absent.

Performance-appraisal design broadly meets basic standards, but implementation tends to overemphasise procedural compliance rather than actual job performance. Inflated ratings also reduce its effectiveness. Decentralised training is complemented by competency-based programmes led by the CSO, which is now also responsible for training on professional knowledge for some horizontal functions under recent legal amendments. However, centralised training remains short-term, tactical and linked to annual appraisals rather than long-term development. Recent CSL amendments have sped up promotion processes but weakened merit safeguards.

There are some measures in place to ensure inclusiveness in public service, particularly for persons with disabilities in recruitment and selection. However, proactive measures to encourage applications are not in place. Only 0.4% of civil servants in the government administration are persons with disabilities.

Overall, the existing legal framework, institutional set-up, related strategy and guidance, practices and results present weaknesses and inconsistencies that limit the effectiveness of the public service and the HRM system.

1. The Government should ensure better alignment of special regulations applying to some groups of public servants in the central government administration and staff in state-controlled private-law bodies performing administrative functions with public service principles of merit and professionalism.

2. The Government should revise the CSO’s scope of competence to ensure that it encompasses the public service in the central government administration, and should remove the CSO’s current responsibilities regarding job classification in independent bodies outside the executive branch.

3. The Government should prepare legislative amendments to expand the scope of the TPM function to the co-ordination of policy areas in ministries, include heads of agencies subordinated to ministries and ensure consideration of merit in access to these positions.

4. The Government should analyse the causes of the low participation of women in TPM jobs and adopt measures to promote gender balance.

5. The Government should ensure that the HRMIS encompasses all public servants in central government administration bodies and is adjusted to their needs. The CSO, in co-operation with the Ministry of Finance, should ensure interoperability of the HRMIS with the payroll system and continue the digitalisation of HRM procedures.

6. The CSO, in co-operation with public bodies, should analyse the low ability to attract candidates and fill vacancies in recruitment procedures and propose measures to address this problem. It should gradually introduce workforce planning and employer branding with this aim.

7. To avoid political influence and ensure merit in selection processes, the Government should propose amendments to the CSL and special legislation applying to other groups of public servants in the central government administration. The CSO should undertake measures, including capacity building, to enhance the professionalism of selection procedures and should improve the predictive value of the assessment methods used.

8. The CSO should continue its efforts to improve the methodology of salary analysis to provide a more solid evidence base regarding current disparities in the allocation of salaries across public service groups and organisations and the competitiveness of public service remuneration.

9. The Government should engage in dialogue with trade unions at the central level and provide a proper platform for this dialogue. It should also encourage co-operation with employee representatives at the level of individual institutions.

10. The CSO should undertake measures to plan and organise public servants’ professional development more strategically and ensure the quality of training.

11. The CSO should propose actions to transform current performance appraisals from process- and output-based to result-oriented.

Principle 8: The employment framework balances stability and flexibility, ensures accountability of public servants and protects them against undue influence and wrongful dismissal.

The scope of the CSL was enlarged in 2018, but in some areas of public administration, the employment regulations are not well aligned with public service principles. While the political responsibility for the civil service is established and the CSO performs its co-ordination and monitoring role, this is not the case for the broader public service. The HRMIS has been developed, but the data in the system is not comprehensive. Interoperability with the payroll system and complete digitalisation of HRM procedures have not yet been implemented.

The Law on Public Service (LPS)1 provides the general legal framework for the wider public service, including integrity. More detailed regulations on the civil service system and HRM are contained in the CSL,2 except for salaries, which are regulated separately.3 The Labour Code applies to the issues not regulated by the CSL.4 All secondary regulations related to the functioning of the civil service have been adopted.

Although the 2018 CSL includes legislative, executive and judicial authorities, the staff of the President, the Prosecutor’s Office, independent bodies and the Ombudsperson Institution, it permits exceptions that ultimately limit the overall scope of the civil service.5 (Figure 26) Special regulations, not always well aligned with public service principles, apply to some parts of public administration, including the professional staff working in the Customs Service, the Tax Service, the Diplomatic Service and the administration of the Parliament.6 In particular, special legislation in the Customs Service, the Tax Service, the Diplomatic Service and the National Assembly establishes that political appointees choose members of selection panels, and political appointees can sit on the panels in the Customs and Tax Services and the National Assembly.7 Competitions are not compulsory to access public service jobs in the National Assembly.8

Private law foundations and other state-controlled bodies of public law are widely used in some policy areas. Since they operate outside the state administration system, their employees are directly under the Labour Law, which does not ensure meritocratic recruitment. They are exempted from the public service remuneration system. (See the analysis of Principle 13 for more details.)

In addition, the LPS establishes that for the implementation of certain tasks and functions assigned to state and local self-government, staff can be employed as “civil workers”, whose employment relations are governed by the Labour Code.9 While most of these positions, as listed in secondary regulations, are support positions, such as technical or particular roles (e.g. IT staff, photographers, translators and journalists), some are generally defined and appear to be typical civil service positions, creating room for abuse. This relates, among others, to assistants of secretaries general, advisors, legal advisors and accountants.10

Two kinds of temporary employment are available in the government administration, and neither can be transformed into permanent employment in the civil service.11 According to the CSL, temporary employment is possible to replace absent civil servants.12 Based on the LPS, it is also possible to involve experts in performing specific tasks, addressing an increased workload, or working on projects and specific assignments.13 The recruitment for both categories of temporary positions does not fully ensure merit.14 In addition, under the LPS, temporary employment of experts is limited to one year, but not in all cases. The share of fixed-term experts in a public body should not exceed 5% of positions, or 10% with the approval of the Government.15

The CSO monitors both modalities of temporary employment, including compliance with existing regulations and the duration of these contracts. While the number of civil servants with fixed-term employment was limited (189 in 2024), the number of experts employed under the Labour Code was more substantial (801 in 2024), which accounts for around 5% of public servants in government administration. Most of them were hired to address workload increases.

The PAR Strategy 2023-2030 and its Roadmap 2023-202516 are in force and encompass public service and HRM. This document refers to the broader public service, includes a situational analysis, sets objectives, defines indicators, outlines deadlines for specific activities, and provides cost estimates. However, the monitoring reports related to the PAR Strategy do not provide the information required to assess progress against the objectives.

While political responsibility for civil service is attributed to one of the Deputy Prime Ministers (DPM),17 it is unclear who bears this responsibility for other public servants not regulated by the CSL. The CSO is responsible for managing the civil service at the operational level, contributing to drafting legislation in this area, and developing the salary policy for government employees.18 The CSO actively performs its role. It issues guidance on HR procedures (except for performance appraisal), influences training content and organises training on competencies, and it has been recently empowered to also organise training related to professional knowledge on horizontal support functions.19 The CSO also ensures the availability of legislation related to civil service on its website and supervises the application of CSL provisions. However, these supervision and control powers are, in practice, limited to a relatively narrow civil service in the central government administration20, except for the approval of job descriptions and classification. In this latter case, the CSO must consent to proposals from all state bodies under the CSL, including the Ombudsperson Institution, which compromises the independence of this body. (See Principle 16 for additional information.)

The CSO does not organise regular meetings and networking activities for HR staff. Effective performance of the monitoring function is hindered by the not-yet-fully-functional HRMIS. The HRMIS is not yet interoperable with the document management system and the payroll system, although interoperability with other relevant systems is in place.21 Some HR processes are still conducted on paper or semi-digitally, and many public bodies manage staff files in parallel in both paper and digital formats. Additionally, the data in the HRMIS is not comprehensive for institutions not covered by the CSL, and this system is not well-suited to their specific needs.

The level of professionalism of HR units varies across public bodies. While in some cases, HR staff benefit from relevant training on HRM, most have not had the opportunity to participate in HR professional events and networks. Most analysed institutions regularly provide HR-related data and analysis to top management, which is a clear improvement compared to 2018.22 There is significant scope to better empower line managers in managing their teams, as their job descriptions lack people-management responsibilities, and newly appointed managers receive no training in this area.

The legislation establishes civil servants' obligation to act professionally and their right to reject illegal orders. A significant proportion of public service managers responding to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the public administration 2025 (77%) do not perceive interference from politicians or people with direct links with political parties in their work. This proportion is statistically significantly higher than the average in Western Balkan administrations (55%) (Figure 27).

The CSL provisions protect civil servants against discretionary dismissals, which is not true for certain special regulations applied to government bodies not covered by the CSL.23 However, the secondary regulations concerning illnesses that may lead to dismissal from the civil service often fail to clearly distinguish between conditions that permanently disqualify individuals from service and those that restrict employment only in certain roles or for limited periods.24

During reorganisation, civil servants can be promoted to a higher position, but in such cases their employment relations change from permanent to fixed-term. If they do not win a competition after the fixed-term appointment expires, they will be dismissed. This peculiar solution does not adequately protect the rights of civil servants.25 SIGMA was unable to analyse the practice of dismissals due to the unavailability of data. According to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the functioning of public administration 2025, a significant share of public servants fear dismissal for political reasons (strongly agree or tend to agree), although this proportion is lower than the average in Western Balkan administrations(36%) (Figure 28).

Principle 9: Public administration attracts and recruits competent people based on merit and equal opportunities.

Competition is the only way to access permanent civil service jobs, and recruitment is non-discriminatory and transparent. Nevertheless, workforce planning is not implemented, and the public service does not invest in recruitment strategies, including employer branding. The average number of eligible candidates per vacancy in public competitions is low (3.2). This decreases the ability to fill advertised jobs; only 35% of vacancies offered for external recruitment were filled in 2024. The recruitment and selection process for the civil service lacks modern assessment tools, and political appointees often influence the selection process, particularly in middle-level managerial positions. The CSL does not fully reflect the requirement to appoint first-ranked candidates.

The CSO does not conduct workforce analysis and planning in the central government administration as the basis for determining recruitment priorities or other HR needs in the civil service.

The CSL establishes clear and non-discriminatory criteria for access to civil service jobs and requires open competitions. Access to other public service jobs in the central government also requires open competitions. However, this is not the case for all state institutions, as non-competitive appointments are possible in the administration of the Parliament.26

Job advertisements are based on job descriptions and include the candidate profile and information on work conditions.27 They are widely advertised through a single, user-friendly government portal that enables online applications and document submission. However, the portal is not accessible from abroad, which may hinder the participation of potential candidates in foreign countries. Public bodies also use other channels for vacancy dissemination, including social media. The CSO has taken initial steps to improve information to potential candidates through a video and guidelines posted on its portal. However, proactive employer branding that encourages potential candidates to join the civil service is currently lacking. Additionally, participating in job fairs is not standard practice among the public bodies analysed.28 Furthermore, legislation establishes too short periods for submitting applications in competitions to fill vacancies above the entry-level.29

There are two main ways of entering the civil service: through open recruitment to specific positions and through pooled recruitment to entry-level positions. Both modalities encompass written testing and an interview. Open recruitment to specific positions is decentralised and performed by public bodies while, for entry-level positions, the CSO administers a general admission examination. Those who pass the exam are ranked on a list that is valid for two years. When filling entry-level vacancies, public institutions must select the five highest-ranked candidates who meet the vacancy requirements from this list and invite them for an interview conducted by the institution.30 In all cases, selection panels are created ad hoc for the interview phase and should comprise at least five members.31 Composition of the panels presents several shortcomings. First, the person responsible for appointing a civil servant to a vacancy should be a member of the selection panel. This is the secretary general for expert and lower-level managerial positions, but the minister appoints heads of departments (middle-level management positions) and can, therefore, be a panel member in such cases. Second, political appointees can participate in the selection panel as field experts. In practice, political appointees were selection panel members in some of the recruitment files analysed. On the positive side, the participation in selection panels is mandatory for the HR unit (the heads or their delegates), and the obligation to declare conflicts of interest applies to all panel members.32

The assessment techniques commonly used have limited predictive value. Testing comprises a computer-based written part, typically a knowledge test, and an unstructured interview. Until the amendments to the CSL adopted in December 2024, the written test assessed professional knowledge and generic competencies, with competency-related questions developed by the CSO and questions on professional knowledge prepared by the recruiting body. The amendments to the CSL33 modify the assessment approach. These changes focus the written test on the assessment of professional knowledge and the ability to apply it. The test includes questions on general legislation, prepared by the CSO, and questions on professional knowledge related to the position, prepared by the recruiting body. Interviews aim to assess knowledge, abilities and competencies. The set of generic competencies for various groups of positions is outlined in regulations,34 along with a list of specific competencies. However, the detailed descriptions of generic competencies are too theoretical and are of limited use for recruitment and other HRM procedures. Specific competencies are not supported by detailed descriptions. As a result, competencies have thus far been used in a largely formalistic manner during selection procedures.

A good practice in Armenia is obtaining some information about the eligibility of applicants through state databases that are interoperable with the HRMIS (including police databases and the state register of legal entities) and verifying information through the same channels in some cases. Nevertheless, candidates must still present some documents held by the Administration when they apply for jobs.35 The CSL only partially incorporates the principle of appointing the highest-ranked candidates. First, the winner of the competition is selected by a vote of the selection panel members, rather than based solely on the scores obtained during the interview.36 Second, the provisions are not explicit on how the selection of winners in the interview happens for entry-level positions. In this case, the recruiting body performs interviews with up to five best-ranked candidates after the written testing.37 However, the regulations do not clearly state whether candidates are ranked after the interview, based on results, and how the winner is chosen.38

Candidates are informed of their results after each stage of the recruitment and selection process, and 74% of respondents to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants2025 were satisfied with the clarity of the information received during recruitment.39 This is similar to the average in Western Balkan administrations (72%).40 The appeal to an administrative instance is only possible for the written part of the testing and only until the candidate leaves the testing room.41 The use of appeals and their outcomes is not monitored, which does not allow the administration to understand and correct its mistakes.

Only two institutions were able to provide data about the length of recruitment processes according to the assessment methodology.42 In both of them, the process was expedited.43 However, due to the reduced sample, the positive observations about the speed of the process cannot be generalised to the entire administration.44

Recruitment results, measured by the ability to attract candidates, remain modest: in 2024, external competitions drew an average of 3.2 eligible candidates per vacancy, similar to the level observed in 2023. The effectiveness of open recruitment in filling vacancies is consistently low, with only 35% of positions filled in 2024, a decline from 2023. A comparison with Western Balkan administrations presents a mixed picture. The attractiveness of open recruitment in Armenia is comparable to that in Kosovo and North Macedonia, but significantly lower than in Albania and Serbia. The proportion of vacancies filled in Armenia is also lower than in the Western Balkans administrations (Figure 29). In Armenia, recruitment outcomes are particularly weak for entry-level competitions, where the ratio of eligible candidates falls below one, and the trend in vacancy fulfilment deteriorated in 2024 (Figure 30).

The probation period in the civil service typically lasts from 6 to 12 months, depending on the position.45 The primary responsibility for onboarding newcomers is assigned to a direct superior and a probationary co-ordinator (one of the civil servants in that body who holds at least an equivalent position); the latter is also responsible for drawing up a work programme for the probationary period.46 According to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants, civil servants perceive onboarding positively regarding the orientation about job tasks and the transmission of core public service values, but they are statistically significantly less positive about the quality of induction training. (Figure 31).

The regulations oblige government administration to provide reasonable accommodation to candidates with disabilities, and candidates can declare their disability when applying.47 However, a more proactive approach to encourage people with disabilities to apply to the civil service or to raise disability awareness among selection panel members was not identified. Legislation also establishes employment quotas for persons with a disability,48 but only 0.4% of civil servants in the government administration are persons with disabilities.

Principle 10: Effective leadership is fostered through competence, stability, professional autonomy and responsiveness of accountable top managers.

There is a high prevalence of permanent appointments in TPM positions and moderate turnover (18% from 2020 to 2024). TPM roles are attractive, with nearly 80% of 2024 competitions drawing at least five eligible candidates. However, these positive elements are undermined by the narrow scope of the function, which in practice is limited to secretary generals, while positions in policy co-ordination in ministries and management of subordinated bodies are held by political appointees. Amendments to the CSL in force since January 2025 allow TPM appointments through direct promotion based on performance appraisals, bypassing open competition. If competitions take place, they are highly susceptible to political influence. Gender balance is far from being achieved.

The TPM category is too narrow, compared to EU standards. While the distinction between professional and political positions is clear in Armenia,49 the differentiation between TPM and lower-management jobs is blurred. The civil service job classification establishes only two broad categories: the so-called “leading category”, which encompasses five grades, without specifying which of them correspond to the top management, and the “professional category”.50 In practice, secretary generals in ministries are classified in the first and second grades in the leading category and are considered top managers. Directors of departments are usually classified at the third grade of the leading category in ministries. They are not equivalent to classical directors-general in EU countries, as there are numerous departments in each ministry and, although the heads report to the minister, their work is supervised by deputy ministers responsible for co-ordinating policy areas.51 Heads and deputy heads of governmental agencies do not enjoy civil service status – they are appointed and dismissed at the Government's discretion.52

Secretary generals in ministries hold open-ended appointments. Stability in these positions is moderate, with an 18% average annual turnover rate between 2020 and 2024, and so is the fluctuation of turnover over the years (Figure 32.) Over the past five years, all terminations in secretary-general positions have been officially recorded as voluntary resignations. The only exception involved disciplinary proceedings.

Acting appointments are not regulated as such in legislation. Job descriptions of civil servants may include the obligation to replace the secretary-general when they are absent. This possibility may also apply when the secretary-general position is vacant. At the end of 2024, there were only two such cases (Figure 33).

The share of women in TPM positions was around 25% in 2020-2024, contrasting with the average in EU Member States (41%),53 in Western Balkan administrations (38%),54 and the high presence of women in civil service lower-level positions in Armenia (48% in other managerial roles and 74% in the professional category). The Government does not undertake any proactive initiatives to increase women's presence at the higher managerial level.

Separate provisions regulate the recruitment and selection of secretary generals, with the CSO responsible for organising this process for government institutions.55 The selection board comprises senior civil servants and political appointees (i.e. deputy ministers and political advisors), appointed from the list adopted by the Government. This does not ensure an objective and professional assessment of candidates.56 In addition, there are no clear criteria for selecting individuals for the list from which the selection panel members are appointed, nor are there criteria for assigning individuals to a specific selection committee from the list.

Although the regulations permit various examination techniques, in practice, the selection process typically consists of a computer-based test of knowledge and competencies, followed by an interview, with the same limitations described in the analysis of Principle 9. Practical case studies, presentations, etc. were not used in any of the selected procedures analysed. In all of them, the highest-ranked candidates were appointed.

Since 1 January 2025, TPM positions can be filled without using competitive recruitment practices. Appointments can be made as a result of promotions based on performance appraisal results, without competition.57

Notwithstanding these shortcomings in accessing TPM jobs, the attractiveness of these positions remains relatively high, with 79% of TPM vacancies in 2024 attracting five or more eligible candidates. This may be a result of a reasonable salary compression ratio (5.6:1) and a relatively competitive ratio between the TPM salaries and the GDP per capita (3.8:1).

According to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants 2025, TPM position holders feel empowered to take managerial decisions autonomously. Most declare that they regularly discuss objectives and expectations with their superiors and undergo performance assessments.58

While the CSO does not organise specific training for TPM holders, 71% declared that they have participated in professional development activities in 2024.59

Principle 11: Public servants are motivated, fairly and competitively paid and have good working conditions.

The salary structure and salary scales are clearly regulated and allow for salary progression. Information on salaries is publicly available. Nevertheless, the perception of salary fairness is low among public servants. The regulation of salary allowances and bonuses leaves too much room for discretion and includes insufficient limitations. While the Government invests much effort in salary benchmarking, the results of the analysis conducted have limited usefulness due to methodological issues. Occupational safety and health are insufficiently regulated, and well-being policies are not yet in place. Social dialogue is virtually absent.

Public servants’ remuneration is comprehensively regulated. Salaries consist of base pay, salary supplements and three kinds of bonuses. Public servants may also enjoy other benefits, including housing and additional paid leave.60

Base salaries are allocated based on the job classification, which follows an analytical job evaluation methodology.61 Base salary grades are set for hierarchical groups and sub-groups of positions. Additionally, within each salary grade, public servants may progress horizontally to higher salary steps (up to 11 in each salary grade), based on seniority and the results of performance appraisals.62 This solution enables sufficient differentiation of salaries among civil servants and promotes progress without requiring a change in position. Salary compression in the civil service is moderate, at a ratio of 1:5.6. Although different salary scales exist for civil servants and specialised administration, such as the diplomatic, tax and customs services, no group has salary coefficients that fall below or exceed the established range for the civil service.

Salary supplements are defined for specific groups of public servants and for specific work conditions, such as overtime work.63 They are capped at 30% of the basic salary,64 with exceptions for certain employment groups for which there is no upper limit. This applies to specific services, such as those in the military, defence and security systems, the police, the diplomatic service, penitentiary, probation and rescue services. However, this privilege is also granted to state servants in the State Revenue Committee, which includes civil servants in general administrative jobs. It also applies to “positions requiring specialisation", which allows for granting this exception in multiple other cases.65

Civil servants may also be eligible for bonuses paid twice yearly based on performance evaluation results. Additionally, the appointing authorities may grant bonuses for special tasks or work quality. The third type of bonus relates to successfully implementing experimental projects that optimise work organisation.66 The first and third types of bonuses are allocated based on objective criteria, such as performance appraisal results or achieving the programme's objectives. However, the second type is paid based on a subjective decision by the appointing authority, without any explicit role by the direct line manager. There are no upper caps for bonuses, which can be paid from a bonus fund and other sources.67

This regulatory framework has led to a fair allocation of base salaries in ministries in practice, but high disparities in salary supplements and bonuses (Figure 35).

In other administrative bodies in the central government administration, there is also significant variation in base salaries (

Figure 36). Consistently, despite comprehensive regulations on base salaries, the perception of salary fairness is low, with only 31% of public servants who responded to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the functioning of public administration 2025 perceiving that salaries are paid fairly across the public administration. This proportion is similar to the Western Balkan average (29.6%).

Despite these disparities in remuneration across public bodies in the central government, 62% of surveyed public servants in management positions declare that their organisation's incentive system, considering monetary and non-monetary rewards, improves performance (Figure 37).

This value is high compared to the results of the same survey conducted in the Western Balkans (45%).68

The predictability of the public service wage bill is low. The comparison of the planned salaries from the Medium-term Budgetary Framework for 2022-2024 (adopted in 2021) with those paid in 2023 shows that the planning did not anticipate salary increases in public sector employees implemented in the 2023 state budget which led to a deviation of the actual spending of 20%.69

In Armenia, public servants’ salaries are subject to a reasonable degree of transparency. The information on base salaries is available in job announcements. The CSO makes information about the salary scale of civil servants available on their website70 and regularly produces publicly available comparative reports on the salaries in public service.71 Such reports were prepared every third year, but starting in 2025, they will be prepared annually.72 They include a comparison of total salaries for selected positions with similar groups in the private sector. In addition, they include detailed information on civil service salaries broken down, for instance, by public bodies, gender and position groups. Comparisons to previous years are also available. Unfortunately, due to methodological issues, the usefulness of these reports in obtaining a real picture of the competitiveness of civil servants` salaries vis-à-vis business is limited. In particular, the temporal scope and the source and type of data differ, which does not ensure a comparison of all components of remuneration in both sectors, despite some adjustments introduced by the CSO.73

The lack of reliable data makes it impossible to comment on the level of voluntary turnover. Nevertheless, the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the functioning of public administration 2025 suggests that public service is considered an attractive employer, as 79% of respondents are willing to recommend their organisation as a good place to work. This proportion is higher than the average in the Western Balkan administrations (69%) (Figure 38).

Occupational safety and health are insufficiently regulated in Armenia.74 For example, this concerns the insufficient regulations governing how the occupational safety and health function should be performed in public bodies and the stability of work for staff performing this function. Government administration bodies do not regularly run job satisfaction or engagement surveys, and staff absenteeism was not monitored in some of the analysed public bodies.

While provisions in force allow for flexible working arrangements and telework,75 this possibility is rarely used in public bodies.76

Dialogue between the Government and trade union representatives is limited. Civil servants have a right to become members of unions.77 However, due to the absence of a relevant institutional framework (tripartite or bipartite commission), a platform for structured dialogue between the Government and public service employee representatives does not exist.78 As a result, trade unions can comment on draft regulations concerning employee rights only through the general consultation process. In most of the cases analysed, individual public bodies did not actively engage in the dialogue with employee representatives.

Principle 12: Professional development, talent and performance management enhance the skills, efficiency and effectiveness of public servants and promote civil service values.

Performance appraisal design fulfils basic standards but is ineffective in practice. The standards place excessive emphasis on formal aspects of work rather than substantive performance and are affected by inflated appraisal results. Decentralised training is supplemented by competency-based training and professional knowledge training on horizontal topics, delivered by the CSO. However, competencies remain only formally defined, and training is overly focused on gaps in operational performance. Recent amendments to the CSL have made promotions faster and more flexible, although this has come at the cost of safeguarding merit-based promotions.

Current CSL regulations have abandoned the periodic attestation (examination) of staff and replaced it with performance appraisals. Still, the old practice persists in some institutions not covered by the CSL, including the Tax Service, the Foreign Service and the administration of the Parliament. Some institutions covered by the CSL that do not use the uniform data management system did not implement performance appraisals.79

Staff performance appraisals largely comply with the basic requirements in the Principles and present interesting characteristics. The regulation on performance appraisals creates close links between organisational and individual performance.80 Staff performance is assessed based on individual work plans which are introduced in the electronic document management system. The system allows tracking of implementation and the performance appraisal results are expressed in points (up to 100), instead of on a traditional scale with a limited number of levels. Performance evaluation combines assessment based on pre-defined objectives (90%) and assessment of competencies (10%).81 Objectives are set using a bottom-up approach, where staff members propose objectives and discuss them with their managers. Evaluation interviews are compulsory. Performance appraisal results are linked to identifying training needs, awarding salary steps and determining the amount of semi-annual bonuses. They are also considered to establish the right of preference to remain in service in case of release from the position or termination of employment due to reorganisation or restructuring procedures.82 The employment of civil servants can be terminated if their annual performance evaluation is below a certain level.83 In addition, the recent amendments to the CSL have introduced the possibility of promotions based on performance appraisal results, including to TPM positions.84

Performance assessment does not work well in practice. First, 99.6% of civil servants were rated above 80% (the regulations set the threshold of 60%, below which performance appraisal results are considered negative). Second, according to information collected in meetings with officials in Armenia, performance appraisals have become a formal exercise, emphasising the timely production of documents over the assessment of substantive contributions and results. Third, only 55% of public servants who responded to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the functioning of public administration 2025 reported having discussions with their superiors about their performance. To address these issues, in 2025 the Government is piloting a new results-based performance appraisal system aligned with semi-annual priorities derived from the overall strategic priorities of the Government. The results of this pilot are yet to be seen. Nonetheless, 67% of respondents to the survey agreed that performance evaluation improves employees' performance in their organisation, and only 20% thought that underperformers usually stay in their organisations and continue to underperform.85 These values are remarkably better than the average survey results in Western Balkan administrations (49% agreed that evaluation improves performance and 42% thought that underperformers stay on and continue to underperform).86

While training is largely decentralised in governmental administration, the CSO retains specific co‑ordination competences, including giving consent to training programmes planned by individual bodies, organising training related to competencies and monitoring the training results.87 Recent CSL amendments (effective from June 2025) empower the CSO to organise training for horizontal issues, which is a positive development.

The CSO performs a bottom-up training needs analysis through HRMIS to plan centralised training on competencies. In practice, it focuses primarily on the training needs of civil servants whose performance was rated below 90% of maximum points, who are obliged to attend this training.88 Given the high proportion of performance results above 90%, this obligation applies to a modest number of civil servants (363 out of 6 457 staff evaluated in 2024, or 6%). However, the actual participation in training related to competencies organised by the CSO was higher in 2024 (863 civil servants out of 6 708, or 13%).

These centralised training courses do not address the strategic needs of the civil service. Central training is offered onsite and through an e-learning platform. More flexible approaches to learning and development, such as networks and communities of practice that facilitate learning through collaboration, discussion and sharing, or personalised learning paths, are not yet implemented.

The CSO outsources the organisation of training on competencies, mainly to the Public Administration Academy, through tender procedures. It monitors the implementation of this training, but the monitoring is not comprehensive. For example, it is not mandatory for training organisers to survey participants on the quality of the training. The CSO does not monitor the implementation of decentralised training organised by public bodies, so the data on overall spending on training and participation were unavailable. Despite these limitations, 74% of managers in Armenia’s central government administration who responded to the SIGMA survey perceived the training received by their staff as useful and relevant.89 The recent amendments to the CSL allowed the CSO, besides competency-based training, to organise professional knowledge training related to horizontal topics.90 The formulation of secondary regulations limit this training to core support functions, such as financial management, HRM, internal audit, IT and digital.91

Decentralised training refers to areas specific to the work of a particular body.92 This training, should, as a rule, be based on needs identified through individual performance evaluations. However, the amendments to the CSL have introduced greater flexibility, allowing civil servants to participate in training related to their job descriptions and priority tasks of the public body.93

CSL enables various forms of horizontal mobility for civil servants, including swaps, transfers and secondments.94 It also establishes clear grounds for permanent mobility, which is not the case for temporary assignments.95 Performance appraisal results are considered when making mobility decisions. There is no portal to advertise vacant positions, which would facilitate horizontal transfers, and there are no regular reports or monitoring of these procedures.

Until 2025, promotions in the civil service were only possible as a result of internal competition. Since then, promotion procedures have been made more flexible and expedited, albeit at the expense of professionalism. Since the beginning of 2025, promotions have also been possible based solely on the results of performance appraisals, without a formal examination of candidates. In addition, recent amendments to the CSL (which entered into force in June 2025) cancelled the written part of the examination in internal competitions, leaving only the interview. When such competitions take place, political appointees may sit on selection panels, and this does happen in practice.96

Respondents to the SIGMA Survey of Public Servants on the functioning of public administration 2025, however, rated the influence of job performance in career progression as high, while factors such as support from family, friends, politicians and personal connections were perceived as less important. These results are statistically significantly better than the average results in Western Balkan administrations (Figure 40.).

Public administration does not actively promote positive action in favour of disadvantaged groups, except for gender-related awareness campaigns financed by donors.