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on

THE CHANGING ROLE OF PARLIAMENT
IN THE BUDGET PROCESS

Session One

Keynote Speech

by

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Biography

Barry Anderson is currently Head of the Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. In this position, Mr. Anderson provides OECD’s Working Party of Senior Budget Officials (SBO) with identification and analyses of international budget trends and issues. Prior to joining OECD, Mr. Anderson was a budget advisor at the International Monetary Fund, where he consulted with senior government officials on budget and management issues. Before joining IMF, Mr. Anderson served in various positions dealing with federal budgeting in the United States Federal Government, most recently as the Deputy Director and then the Acting Director of the Congressional Budget Office; before that as the Assistant Director and senior career civil servant at the White House’s Office of Management and Budget; and before that at the General Accounting Office. He has also been a member of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, and has taught courses on the US budget process for George Washington University and the Office of Personnel Management.
Let me start by thanking the organizers of the international symposium – the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; my OECD friends at SIGMA; TODAIE, the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East; the World Bank; and MATRA FLEX of the Netherlands – for the opportunity to speak on the changing role of parliament in the budget process. It is a subject that we at OECD are actively engaged in. In addition, because I have spent roughly equal amounts of my career in budgeting in the executive and legislative branches of government, I personally enjoy discussion of the nuances of the relationships between the executive and the legislature.

The art of budgeting has always been difficult, and in a world where many societies are ageing, where the effects – both potential and actual – of global warming seem to grow every day, where globalization has exposed societies more to the actions of others, and where governments increasingly provide a variety of complex financial guarantees (such as public-private partnerships), it isn’t going to get any easier.

Unfortunately, the increased difficulty of budgeting all too often promotes efforts by executives to diminish accountability. Rare is the executive who is willing to discuss the long-term fiscal sustainability of his government with reference to its promises to its aged, for example. Instead, executives frequently choose to evade discussions of problems associated with aging, global warming, globalization, guarantees, and other fiscal risks, and concentrate only on near-term issues. But as the potential consequences of these fiscal risks increase, the costs of this evasion becomes more severe.

We at OECD have looked into the role that legislatures can play to encourage executives to discuss the risks their societies face in a more open and informative manner. We have observed that executives will rarely improve accountability on their own without some kind of external influence encouraging them to do so. We have also observed the success that some countries have had in increasing the legislature’s involvement in the budget process as the source of this external influence.

As Allen Schick, one of the very few academics able to describe trends in budgeting in an informative manner, has commented, two contemporary developments are buffeting legislative work on the budget. One is the drive to discipline public finance by constraining the fiscal aggregates; the other is the effort to enlarge the legislature’s role in revenue and spending policy. Whether these trends turn out to be complementary or contradictory will shape the budgetary role of national legislatures in the years ahead. One scenario is for the legislature to reinforce fiscal discipline by taking responsibility for the budget’s totals. Another is for it to undermine discipline by bombarding the budget submitted by the government with legislative amendments that trim revenues or boost expenditures.

The early signs point to the former course, but the history of budgeting and some contemporary research assume the latter. In a growing number of countries, the national legislature now votes the budget totals, in addition to its traditional work on revenue and spending measures. Maastricht type rules and other efforts to stabilize public finance may spur national governments and their legislatures to frame budgetary decisions within preset totals. Where this occurs, legislative work on the budget will parallel the Government’s, and may result either in greater cooperation or greater rivalry between the two branches. In some countries, the legislature’s new responsibility...
for the overall budget will buy it greater independence in fiscal policy. In others, the legislature will behave more as a partner than as an adversary. The probability is that adversarial relationships will predominate in presidential systems and cooperative relationships in parliamentary regimes. But other variables, such as the party system, may intervene to induce cooperation in governments where power is formally divided and to generate friction in countries where power is formally shared.

As Schick points out, legislative activism may lead in an entirely different direction, however; not to greater fiscal discipline, but to budgets in which pressure to spend more and to tax less generate chronic deficits and to a progressive rise in the share of national income spent by the government. As unlikely as this may appear to contemporary promoters of legislative activism, it has been the predominant view of legislatures for hundreds of years. In some countries, the legislature voluntarily yielded budgetary power to the executive because it accepted the view that parliamentarians cannot constrain their political inclination to tax less and spend more. Legislatures entrusted budgetary power to the executive because they could not trust themselves to make responsible financial decisions. This attitude is endorsed by prominent scholars who correlate the legislature’s capacity to amend the budget with fiscal outcomes. For example, in an influential paper published by the European Commission, Jorgen Von Hagen found strong empirical support for the hypothesis that limits on the amendment power of parliament and other rules strengthen fiscal discipline and result in relatively small deficits and public debt. There may be reason to challenge this finding, but its validity is less important than its acceptance.

Although there are some notable exceptions, national legislatures generally are now more active on budgetary matters than they were in the post World War II era. An OECD study reported that legislatures in more than half the countries surveyed had a larger budgetary role than they had a decade earlier. The evidence of legislative activism is plentiful; new committees charged with legislative or oversight responsibilities; enlarged budget staffs; a vast increase in the flow of budget related information from government to legislators; an increased vigilance by independent or legislative auditors in reviewing the propriety and efficiency of expenditures. But adding institutional capacity does not itself ensure that legislators will stake out an independent position on the budget. To do so, they also need the political capacity to reject salient elements on the government’s budget.

In dealing with budgets and other matters, legislatures face tension between the self interest of members to promote their careers by concentrating on their constituents and the collective interest of the institution to produce sound, coherent legislation. As individuals, members tend to favor increased spending on particular items; as part of a government institution, they have an imperative to adopt prudent revenue and spending totals. Numerous variables influence the manner in which legislators resolve these cross pressures, including party discipline, the electoral system, budget rules, and relations between the government and the legislature. As these variables differ among countries, so too does legislative treatment of the budget. Westminster style legislatures characteristically resolve tensions between the budget’s parts and totals by severely restricting the power of legislators to amend the government’s budget. Congress style legislatures typically allow members broad scope to revise the budget and make their own revenue and spending decisions. European parliaments generally fall between these extremes; they permit legislators to modify the budget, but restrict changes to the totals.
Although legislatures differ in their budget roles, we can discern three stages in their evolution:

1. Emergence of the legislature’s power to tax and spend;

2. Development of government capacity and processes to formulate and implement the budget; and

3. Introduction of a legislative budget process.

The first two stages coincide in countries that have embraced democracy only recently, but they have been separated by generations or even centuries in countries that have a long history of democracy. In these countries, the first stage evolved in the course of efforts to build an independent national legislature. The second emerged in the course of developing administrative institutions. The third stage is underway in some countries, but has not yet started in many others. And it may never emerge in countries that assign a passive role to the legislature on budget matters.

My intent here is not to conduct a historical tour of budgeting, but to highlight the importance of nonpartisan, independent, objective, analytic budget information to shed light on the contemporary roles of democratic legislatures. Parliaments are institutions steeped in tradition. Getting them to change is not simply a matter of grafting new practices onto the old, but of rethinking their place. This certainly is the case with respect to the use of budget information by the legislature, for new responsibilities must be accommodated both to long-standing appropriations processes and to political relations with government.

To be able to credibly encourage more accountability from the executive, legislatures need help in understanding complex budget issues and processes. Currently, legislatures in different countries play a wide variety of roles in the budget formulation process. Some are very actively involved, and some are not involved at all. Moreover, the role that the legislature plays in many countries has changed over time and should continue to change in the future. These changing roles and the need to encourage executive accountability call into question the sources of information that are or may be made available to help the legislature participate in the budget process. Legislatures require reliable, unbiased information to be able to participate constructively in formulating the budget.

Today I will discuss the value that an independent research capacity located in the legislature can have on expanding the legislature’s role in budgeting and holding the executive accountable.

I would like to begin by discussing the potential value to the legislature of having an independent research capacity or unit. I will list and discuss each of the core functions that such a unit can perform; describe other possible functions of the unit; and describe the characteristics required to make the unit nonpartisan and objective, including other characteristics that can enhance the effectiveness of the unit.

I will then discuss trends in establishing independent research units that we at OECD have discerned. These trends come from a number of different sources: from the results of two surveys that list the number of countries with specialized legislative research organizations; and from other information we in the Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division of OECD have gathered.
in our worldwide meetings of senior budget officials, including meetings with officials from Africa, Asia, Central Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East/North Africa as well as with budget officials from OECD countries. I will then offer some concluding remarks.

Potential Value

In its most basic terms, an independent research unit can provide information to put the legislature on a more equal footing with the executive branch. This information is critical if a legislature is to play a real role in budget formulation, and thus is critical in promoting executive accountability. However, as important as this information is, such a unit can do much more than just eliminate the executive’s monopoly in budget information and promote executive accountability. Additional benefits of an independent, analytic, budget unit include:

- **Simplifying complexity.** Budget information is frequently not made available by the executive’s budget office, but even when it is, it may be so complex that the legislature has difficulty understanding it. An independent unit must have the expertise to be able to make complex budget information understandable to the legislature, as well as to the media, academia, and the public.

- **Promoting transparency.** Because of the knowledge and expertise found in an independent budget unit, budgetary legerdemain can be discouraged and transparency promoted.

- **Enhancing credibility.** By encouraging simplification and transparency, an independent unit also has the effect of making all budget forecasts – even those of the executive who is obviously partisan – more credible.

- **Improving the budget process.** The combination of a more simple, transparent, credible, and accountable budget can promote a budget process that is more straightforward and easier to understand and follow.

- **Serving both the majority and minority.** A legislative budget unit – if it is truly nonpartisan and independent – should provide information to both the majority and all minority parties of the legislature.

- **Providing rapid responses.** As a part of the legislature, an independent budget unit can provide much more rapid responses to budget inquiries from the legislature than are usually provided by the executive’s budget office.

- **But most of all, promoting accountability.** The accountability of the estimates that the executive uses in the budget process can be enhanced by an independent research unit because of the scrutiny such a unit provides to the executive’s budget office.

The additional values of an independent legislative budget unit mean that it is much more than just an instrument to assist the legislature in the budget process, or one to help check the executive’s budget power. It also serves the society at large and actually can help improve the whole budget process. However, the value of an independent unit can change over time. At first, the information produced by the unit may be more valuable to the legislature as a whole, as a means to balance the executive’s budget power. But as the unit ages and as the executive adjusts
to the presence of the independent unit, the information it produces may be of more value to minority parties in the legislature in their relationship to the majority party.

I would also note that the above list does not include any mention of promoting the use of performance and results information in the budget process — so called performance budgeting. We at OECD actively promote the use of performance information in the budget process. In fact we recently released a separate document on the issue: “Performance Budgeting in OECD Countries”. But we recognize that countries need to establish solid budget procedures before they try to build more complex budget concepts into their budget systems. Put another way, we encourage countries to learn to walk before they learn to run.

Core Functions

An independent research unit can perform many possible functions, but to best assist the legislature in the budget preparation process, it should perform, at the very least, the following four core functions.

- **Economic forecasts.** All budgetary analyses begin with an economic forecast. The first core function of the unit is to perform an independent economic forecast. Although the unit’s forecasts need to be objective, the unit should take into account the forecasts of others, such as private forecasters, central bankers (if available), international organizations, and panels of experts specifically organized to assist the unit’s forecasters. The forecasts should be based on laws currently in place at the time; that is, they should not try to anticipate future legislation. They also should not try to take into account the economic consequences, if any, of policy proposals. The assumptions used for interest rates and commodity process should not be targets but should be based on the best information available. It is also better for a unit’s forecast to be a little conservative, because it is much easier politically to reduce deficits and debt in an economy that is performing better than was forecasted than it is to try to find last-minute spending cuts or increase taxes to meet a revised deficit target that results from a worse-than-anticipated forecast.

- **Baseline estimates.** The forecasts of spending and revenues should be projections, not predictions. That is, they should be based on laws that are currently in place, not on policy proposals. They should not try to judge the legislative intent of laws, but they should assume, for example, that the expiration dates built into legislation will actually occur, and that the spend-out rates of slow-spending capital projects are based on the best technical information available, not on biased political opinions.

- **Analysis of the executive’s budget proposals.** The third core function of an independent unit is to perform a budgetary assessment of the executive’s proposed budget. Such an assessment should not be a programmatic evaluation, which is basically a time-consuming political exercise, but rather a technical review of the budgetary estimates contained in the executive’s budget. Such a review can actually enhance the credibility of the executive’s budget. This is particularly true where the difference between the two estimates is not great and, for the government’s forecasts as a whole, where the difference between the assessment and the actual outcome is not great.
- **Medium-term analysis.** All of the core functions mentioned above should be performed over at least the medium term, which can then highlight the out-year consequences of current and proposed policy actions. It is particularly important to do a medium-term analysis to take into account various fiscal risks, such as those inherent in loan guarantee programs, commitments to provide pensions, public-private partnership initiatives, and other programs that contain contingent liabilities. A medium-term analysis also provides the basis for a long-term analysis, the importance of which grows as societies age and as the impact of programs that involve intergenerational transfers expands.

Other functions that the independent unit could perform include the following:

- **Analysis of policy proposals.** Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of policy proposals can be made each year by members of the legislature, and the executive often makes many policy proposals in addition to those contained in the budget. An independent unit can provide valuable assistance to the legislature by estimating the costs of these proposals. But because it can be very time consuming to estimate the budgetary impact of every proposal, it may be appropriate for the legislature and the analytic unit to agree on rules – such as estimating the costs of only the proposals with the largest potential budgetary impact or only those proposals approved by a full committee or significant subcommittee – that limit the number of proposals costed by the unit.

- **Options for spending cuts.** Legislatures can often benefit from having available a list of options for spending cuts prepared by an independent unit. The options selected should be based on program effectiveness and efficiency, not on political concerns. *Note here in an area where performance information can be quite useful, but the use of performance information to construct options is much different than setting up a budget system directly tied to performance outputs.* The unit should only list the options; it should not make recommendations for any option, because to do so could raise questions about its independence. As valuable as such a list of options can be to empower the legislature, this function can also be time consuming, although its staffing impact can be mitigated if the listing of options is produced only at the beginning of a new legislative session.

- **Analysis of regulations.** Legislation can affect the economy in more ways than just spending and taxing decisions; through regulations, or mandates, legislation can require actions on the part of corporations, individuals, or subnational governments. An independent unit can review the regulations and provide valuable information to the legislature by estimating the economic impact of them. But again, this can be a time-consuming task, depending on how many regulations the unit reviews and how complex they are.

- **Economic analysis.** The expertise found in an independent budget unit can also be used to perform more extensive economic analyses. These analyses can contributed to the legislature’s understanding of the near-term and long-term budgetary consequences of related policy proposals and also assist the unit’s staff in preparing the core estimates of budget proposals.
• **Tax analyses.** In addition to the types of budgetary and economic analyses mentioned above, a unit can also serve the legislature by performing various types of analyses of tax policies, such as estimating the impacts of proposed or enacted tax changes on economic growth, or measuring the distributional impacts of various types of tax proposals. Again, these analyses can be time consuming, and they can require specialized staff whose skills are not easily transferred to analyses of spending proposals.

• **Policy briefs.** The time demands placed on policy makers in both the executive branch and the legislature, and the complexity of budgets, have created a demand for short, straightforward descriptions of complicated budget proposals and concepts. Such descriptions, or policy briefs, can be of real value not only to busy members of the legislature, but also to the media and the public.

• **Long-term analysis.** As mentioned above, long-term analyses – that is, analysis of potential budgetary trends for as many as 75 years – becomes more valuable to legislatures because of the aging of the populations in many countries, because so many countries have programs that transfer resources (and costs) from one generation to another, and because of other fiscal risks mentioned previously.

As an aside, I would note that for the last several years, we in the Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division of OECD have been actively encouraging countries to undertake long-term budgetary analysis. Many countries are still struggling with developing reliable medium-term budgetary analysis, and thus have difficulty understanding how analysis of potential budgetary trends for 25, 50, or as many as 75 years can be done and be useful to the political process. But we have found that when countries actually sit down with us and walk through the process of undertaking long-term budgetary analysis, they can quickly see how it can be done and how it can be useful to politicians, the press, and the public. Specifically they learn that once they have mastered medium-term analysis, jumping to long-term analysis is not that difficult. Most importantly, they learn that long-term budgetary analysis produces projections, not predictions, and that sensitivity analysis of various potential but basically unknowable outcomes can help frame the near-term fiscal policy debates. It is very relevant to note that in the last few years the European Commission has been performing a study entitled "The Long-Term Sustainability of Public Finances in the European Union", which makes projections extending out for 50 years.

As valuable as each of these other functions can be to the legislature, the size and the staff required to perform them limits the number that can be performed and at the inception of such a unit. However, independent units can be started with responsibilities limited to only the core functions mentioned above, and then the unit’s responsibilities can be grown over the years to include many of these other functions.

**Fundamental characteristics**

Establishing and maintaining an independent research unit that provides objective budgetary information to the legislature is not easy. It is an important challenge that requires a carefully designed, step-by-step development process combined with a medium and long term plan.

Certain fundamental characteristics of the unit must be present if the unit is to be successful. Foremost of these is the nonpartisan nature of the unit. Note that *nonpartisan* is much different
from *bipartisan*: the former connotes lack of a political affiliation; the latter connotes affiliation with both (or all) political parties. A unit that is bipartisan would attempt to present its analysis from the perspective of both (or all) political parties, whereas a unit that is nonpartisan would *not* present its analysis from a political perspective. Clearly a nonpartisan unit would be superior in presenting objective information. The director of such a non partisan unit may be a member of a political party, but this does not make the unit itself partisan as long as: the director is more of a technician than a politician; he or she operates the agency in a nonpartisan manner; and the staff is composed entirely of technicians.

Operation in a nonpartisan manner would require, among other things, that the same information be provided to the majority and minority parties. Other fundamental characteristics of a nonpartisan unit include:

- Making the outputs of the unit, and the methods by which those outputs are prepared, transparent (especially reports that are critical of proposed policies) and understandable;
  - a corollary of this is to place all the unit’s outputs and methods on the internet so that everyone has access to them;
- placing the core functions of the unit in law so that they can’t be easily changed to suit political purposes;
- avoiding recommendations;
- principally serving committees or subcommittees rather than individual members;
- being willing to meet with lobbyists or other proponents – as well as opponents – of policy proposals, keeping in mind that a fair, balanced process – and the *appearance* of a fair, balanced process – is always important;
- locating the unit’s offices separate from the legislature, but always answering requests in a responsive and timely manner, and,
- avoid the limelight.

**Trends of independent budget units**

More and more countries are starting independent budget units as their legislatures become more involved in the budget process. This is occurring in both presidential and parliamentary systems, and both within and outside of OECD.

There have been two recent surveys of independent budget units.

- In 2006, the European Commission conducted a survey on fiscal rules and institutions. The results of the survey revealed 22 independent fiscal institutions in 14 EU member states. Of these 22 institutions, 16 issue normative statements or recommendations mainly through regular parliamentary hearings.
• In 2007, my division in OECD conducted a survey of 30 OECD and 8 non-OECD countries on budget practices and procedures (OECD 2007). One of the questions in the survey was: “Is there a specialized budget research office/unit attached to the legislature to conduct analyses of the budget?” Of the 38 countries, 16 responded that they have either a specialized unit or some other kind of capacity to conduct such analyses. These 16 include the following countries in the European Union: Belgium, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. We at OECD are in the process of expanding this survey to include 60 more countries from Africa and Asia. The results of this expansion should be available in the next month or so.

In addition to the European countries mentioned above, it is worth noting that Mexico and Korea have started independent budget offices in the last few years and they are continuing to add functions and staff to these units. Canada just started a Parliamentary Budget Office a few months ago, and although it has only a few staff now, it too is expanding. We are also aware of independent budget units in non-OECD countries, such as Brazil.

The oldest independent budget unit is the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB), which currently has about 145 staff. Although its name is very misleading – it certainly doesn’t do any central planning - the CPB does have two attributes that I believe may be unique. First, it is located under the executive, not the legislative branch; nevertheless, it is truly independent, and that is what really matters. Second, in addition to doing most of the functions listed above, the CPB also provides estimates of the campaign promises of politicians. These estimates have been so well received that the public basically demands that any campaign promise made by a political candidate in Holland must be accompanied by a CPB estimate of the budgetary cost of the promise.

The biggest independent budget unit is the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO evolved from a small budgetary research unit in the Congress. The law that created CBO provided only general guidance as to what its functions should be. Although CBO now performs all of the functions listed above, it was not clear at its inception exactly what work it would do and what work the staff of the newly created budget committees would do. In fact, a former CBO director [Bob Reischauer, in Kates (1989)], who was CBO’s first Deputy Director when it was created, said that one view was to severely limit CBO’s role:

“What the House wanted [when CBO was created] was basically a manhole in which Congress would have a bill or something and it would lift up the manhole cover and put the bill down it, and 20 minutes later a piece of paper would be handed up, with the cost estimate, the answer, on it. No visibility, [just] some kind of mechanisms down below the ground level doing this … non controversial [work], the way the sewer system [does].”

CBO was able to expand its functions far beyond what was stated in this quote in large part because of the efforts it made from its inception to explicitly structure itself as a non partisan, independent, objective analytic agency. CBO has about 235 staff to do all these functions. I was the Deputy Director and the Acting Director of CBO from 1999 to mid 2003. During this time I spoke to many visitors from other countries who were interested in providing better budget
information for the legislatures in their countries and wanted to learn what CBO did and how it did it.

Virtually all of these visitors were somewhat put off by the size of CBO, saying they could never have a new agency that large in their countries. But before automatically rejecting CBO as a potential model, I encouraged them then, and I encourage you now, to think of the staffing of CBO relevant to the distribution of CBO staff by core and other functions (see Table 1), as discussed above. I then suggest that you compare this with the staffing for core functions of two sub-national agencies in the US (see Table 2): the State of California’s the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) and the City of New York’s Independent Budget Office (IBO)\textsuperscript{vii}.

Core functions—executive direction; macroeconomic and tax analysis; budget analysis; and technical and administrative functions—at CBO and LAO require about 50 staff each. This figure may be more relevant as a model for a number of countries, such as Mexico and Korea, who have larger economies and more complex budgets. However, the size and complexity of the US Government and California budgets are much greater than the budgets of many other countries, so that the approximately 27 staff performing core functions in New York City’s IBO may offer a more appropriate comparison for many countries.

The point I would like to leave you with here is that an independent budget unit can be created with a relative modest investment. However, to emphasize what I said previously, establishing and maintaining an independent research unit is a difficult challenge that requires a carefully designed development process combined with a medium and long term plan.

**Concluding Remarks**

As I stated at the beginning of my speech, to be able to play a substantive role in the budget formulation process, legislatures need help in understanding complex budget issues and processes. This need can be well served by an independent source of budget information. Examples of offices that provide this information can be seen in a number of countries, particularly in the Netherlands and in the United States. However, such independent research units have also been created within the legislature itself and not as separate legislative offices or bureau. Once created, such a unit must operate in a credible and impartial manner if its value is to be sustained.

Turkey faces choices with respect to the role of Parliament in its budget process. I hope I have made a good case that the use of an independent research capacity in the legislature is an attainable goal. But as Turkey considers establishing such a unit, I think it appropriate that Turkey ask themselves some question about Parliament’s role:

- Should Parliament have its own independent research unit, and/or should it rely on government data and analysis?
- Could Parliament establish a research unit that would really be nonpartisan, independent, and objective?
- Should Parliament be restricted in action on the budget, or should it be permitted to take any action it wants?
• Should Parliament formally vote on budget aggregates, or should it deal only with particular revenue and spending decisions?

• Should Parliament consider only the annual budget, or should it explicitly recognize and make medium-term decisions?

• How quickly should performance targets be incorporated into the government’s and Parliament’s budgeting processes?

• Should Parliament strengthen its own capacity to monitor and control public accounts, and if it does, how should it do so?

• Should Parliament actively utilize external resources such as the Supreme Audit Institution (the Turkish Court of Accounts or TCA) to support its oversight functions?

I know these aren’t easy questions to answer, but I encourage you to consider them. Accountability matters, but is not easily or quickly obtained. I hope I have given you some ideas about how to promote it.

Thanks again for the opportunity to kick off this symposium. I welcome any comments or questions you may have.
References


## Tables

### Table 1: Distribution of CBO Staff

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<th>Function</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
<td>Executive direction</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic analysis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax analysis</td>
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<td>Budget analysis</td>
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<td>Baseline</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>235</td>
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*Source: Author’s estimates.*

### Table 2: Staffing by Core Function

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<th>Core Function</th>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>IBO (NYC)</th>
<th>LAO (Calif)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Executive direction</td>
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<td>Macroeconomic and tax analysis</td>
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*Source: Author’s estimates.*


Schick, p.33.


See [http://www.lao.ca.gov](http://www.lao.ca.gov) for information on California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office, and [http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us](http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us) for information on New York City’s Independent Budget Office.